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2NATIONBUILDING IN EURASIA
Pål Kolstø, University of Oslo
Seemingly,  fifteen new states were established in Eurasia in 1991 after the demise of 
Communism in the Soviet Union. However, a 'state' in the full sense of the word does not 
come about simply by a political proclamation of independence, still not by international 
recognition. A true state must have control of its own frontiers, a monopoly of coercive 
powers on its territory, be able to collect tolls and taxes, etc. To carry out these tasks a 
modicum of administrative apparatus is needed, as well as a broad consensus in society of the 
rules and routines for how the jobs shall be done. 
In the fall of 1991 these preconditions were generally not fulfilled in any of the Soviet 
successor states. The armed forces on their territories and the levers of economic policy were 
beyond the control of the new state authorities. There also were no border defence systems 
between the new states, indeed, state borders were not even delineated in the terrain. 
For these reasons it is more appropriate to say that on New Year's Day 1992 the groundwork 
for the building of fifteen new states in Eurasia were laid. The establishment of governmental 
institutions and other state attributes is a prolonged process which will continue for decades.
In this article, however, I will leave aside the economic and institutional aspects of of this 
process and instead focus on some crucial political and cultural issues, 'nation-building' in the 
strict sense of the word as distinct from 'state-building'. In order to keep a state together in the 
modern world, it is essential that its population have a common identity and a shared feeling 
of common destiny. The citizens must be bound together by loyalty towards the same 
institutions, symbols and values. This does not necessarily imply that all inhabitants of the 
state must partake in the same ethnic identity. National identity may, and in many cases must, 
be political rather than cultural. 
The USSR prided itself of being a 'multinational state', indeed, some hundred different ethnic 
groups were registered as living on its territory. In contrast, with one exception, all of the 
successor states, have been proclaimed as 'national states' or 'nation-states'.1 This basic 
concept can have (at least) two very different meanings. In the West, the dominant 
understanding is that of a political and civic entity, in which the nation is delineated on the 
basis of common territory, common government and to some extent common political history. 
There exists, however, a rival concept of a nation as a cultural entity, based on common 
language, traditions, mores, religion, etc. in short: an ethnic nation. This concept has deep 
roots in Russia, for several reasons. In Western Europe the driving force behind the creation 
of consolidated nation-states was primarily the bourgeoisie, but in Russia this social group 
was numerically weak and without political clout. The dynastic, imperial state, in which the 
attempts of conscious nation-building were few and ham-fisted, was able to hold the ground 
1 The exception is Russia,  which will be left out of this survey.  Nation-building in Russia 
certainly deserves, and receives, serious attention,  but reasons of space and also some 
principal reasons have dictated its exclusion from this article. Russia is not only a Soviet 
successor state but also the remnants of the former centre. The preconditions for nation-
building are therefore radically different. For a useful introduction to Russian nation-building 
see Valerii Tishkov, 'Nationalities and conflicting ethnicity in post-Communist Russia, United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, DP 50, March 1994. 
3much longer. Under such conditions the various language groups developed into strong 
national identities.2 
These age-long experiences of the tsar's subjects were reinforced in the Soviet period. The 
idea behind the Soviet federation was to mollify all major ethnic groups by giving them the 
trappings of their own statehood. These groups became the titular nationalities of the various 
Union republics: The Ukraine Soviet Republic was named after the ethnic Ukraines, the 
Turkmen SSR after the Turkmen tribes, etc. Within their 'own' territory the titular 
nationalities were given certain special cultural rights, particularly as regards educational 
opportunities and language policy.3 At the same time Soviet authorities did nothing to create 
ethnically pure Union republics in the demographic sense. The many ethnic groups had for 
centuries been living strongly intermingled with each other, and considerable interrepublican 
migration further complicated the ethnic map. 
This is the dual legacy which the new states of Eurasia have to come to grips with when they 
today embark upon their various nation-building projects: on the one hand, an exclusionary 
nation concept which equates the nation with the ethnic group. On the other hand, a medley of 
disparate ethnic groups on the state territory. With the partial exception of Armenia, the non-
titular population everywhere make up considerable minorities, in some cases close to half of 
the total. (see table)
After four years of post-Soviet nation-building certain patterns are emerging. Almost 
everywhere the titular nation has been placed in the centre of the project and given certain 
prerogatives, implicitly or explicitly. For instance, everywhere the language of the titular 
nation has been elevated to the status of state language. It would, however, be wrong to claim 
that the new states of Eurasia are based exclusively on the ethnic principle. Their new state 
structures embody elements taken from both the civic and the ethnic model. These two nation 
concepts seem to be living in uneasy co-habitation. 
In ethnic nation-building the symbols and traditions of the state are identified with the 
symbols and traditions of titular nation. The state authorities try to bring about a maximum 
correspondence between the ethnic and political nation. The preferred methods are 
outmigration of the minorities and/or their exclusion from the political decision-making. Two 
other methods, assimilation and border revisions, which also could lead to greaster cultural 
homogeneity of the state, are less popular. Few nation-builders will countenance a truncation 
of state territory as a result of transfers of minority-inhabited regions to neighbouring states. 
Ethnically oriented nation-builders are also afraid that the assimilation of large minority 
communities may dilute the purity of their ethnic group. The minorities, they believe, should 
learn the state language, venerate the traditions and history of the titular nation, but not merge 
with it. 
In a civic nation-building project the authorities will try to secure the political loyalty of all 
inhabitants without encroaching upon their cultural distinctiveness. Political rights are 
extended to all inhabitants on an equal footing. Political traditions and symbols common to all 
ethnic groups are cultivated, or, if necessary, created from scratch. One of the shortcomings of 
this strategy is the weaker emotive power of supraethnic symbols. They may easily by 
dismissed as artifacts, which of course in a sense they are. Nevertheless, large population 
2 Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvölkerreich, Munich 1993,  H. Beck.
3 Victor Zaslavsky, ‘Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Post-communist Societies’, 
Dædalus, CXXI  no. 2 (Spring 1992),  pp. 97-121.
4groups in multiethnic societies may develop a double set of identities: Politically, they are 
proud of being citizens of this particular state, culturally, they identify strongly with their own 
ethnic group. Large groups in for instance multiethnic United States have this kind of dual 
identity. 
A final complicating factor in Eurasian nation-building is the lack of ethnic consolidation of 
the titular nations themselves. In many areas there are strong group loyalties on lower levels, 
towards the tribe, clan, subethnos, or region, competing with the ethnic identity. Many of the 
'nations' of Central Asia are recent constructs of modern ethnographers and Communists 
politicians, who wanted to create quasi nation-states in the area in order to break down 
allegiances to such overarching ideologies as pan-Turkism and the Muslim Ummah. Even in 
such a Western nation as the Ukrainians the process of ethnic consolidation is not yet fully 
completed. There are strong cultural differences between Galicia in the West and Donbass in 
the East of the country. In cases when the ethnic consolidation and political nation-building 
are parallel processes, they often interfere with each other, and may even be collapsed into a 
single venture of ethnic nation-building. 
Below I will compare the nation-building projects in the various Soviet successor states with 
regard to their respective preconditions, declaratory aims, and the means employed. While 
there are many common features, there are also important differences. Up to a point these 
variations are due to demographic, historical and other 'objective' circumstances. Political 
decisions and other 'subjective' factors, however, also play their part. In some countries the 
nation builders have been able to follow one and the same strategy more or less consistently, 
in other places abrupt changes have occurred.4 
The Baltics.
The Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are all well consolidated as ethnic groups. (A partial 
exception is the Latvians; the strong regionalism among Eastern Latgallians is a source of 
some tension.) This means that the questions of how the nation should be defined revolves 
around the relationship to the non-titular groups, primarily the Russians and other 
Russophones who arrived in large numbers in the Soviet period. 
 
The fact that the three Baltic countries were independent states in the interwar period has a 
strong bearing upon their choice of nation-building strategy today. During perestroika  the 
Balts did not proclaim the independence of new states, but restored the states which had been 
forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union half a century earlier. In contrast to the twelve 
other post-Soviet states they do not see themselves as 'Soviet successor states' at all. They do 
not lay claim to any part of the property or outstanding claims of the former Soviet Union but 
instead demand reparations for the damage which has been inflicted upon them during the 
occupation. 
4 It goes without saying that within the framework of a short article only some  principal 
tendencies may be outlined while many nuances are left out. For more details, see my  Paul 
Kolstoe Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London/Bloomington, 1995, 
Chr.Hurst/Indiana University press; Pål Kolstø, 'National Minorities in the Non-Russian 
Soviet Successor States of the Former Soviet Union', RAND corporation, DRU-565-FF; 
Karen Dawisha og Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia,  Cambridge, 1994: 
Cambridge University press;  and Roland Dannreuther,  Creating New States in Central Asia, 
Adelphi Papers 288,  Brassey, London 1994.
5The interwar state symbols - flags, anthems, insignia, etc. - are reinstituted and have the 
strong emotional appeal which state authorities in all countries want to invest in such 
symbols. This is due not least to the fact that they were outlawed in the Soviet period and 
during perestroika were used as democratic countersymbols to the detested Soviet emblems.
Table 1
ETHNICITY IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES, 1989 IN % OF THE TOTAL POPULATION.
STATE
titular  
population 
largest minority  
group
next largest  
minority group
Russia 81.5 Tatars
3.7
Ukrainians 2.9
Estonia 61.5 Russians
30.3
Ukrainians 3.0
Latvia 51.8 Russians
34.0
Belorusian
4.5
Lithuania 79.5 Russians
9.4
Poles
7.0
Belarus 77.8 Russians
13.2
Poles
4.0
Moldova 64.4 Ukrainians 13.8 Russians
13.0
Ukraine 72.7 Russians
22.1
Jews
0.9
Georgia 70.0 Armenians
7.9
Russians
6.3
Armenia 93.3 Azeri
2.5
Kurds
1.7
Azerbaijan 82.6 Russians
5.6
Armenians
5.5
Turkmenistan 71.8 Russians
9.5
Uzbeks
8.8
Tajikistan 62.2 Uzbeks
23.3
Russians
7.6
Uzbekistan 71.2 Russians
8.3
Tajiks
4.6
Kyrgyzstan 52.2 Russians
21.5
Uzbeks
12.9
Kazakhstan 39.6 Russians
37.8
Germans
5.7
Source: Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Moscow, 1991
Contemporary Baltic nation-builders do not feel obliged to resurrect the entire interwar 
heritage. The Latvians have reenacted the prewar constitution, but after three years of bitter 
strife finally adopted a brand new citizenship law. Estonia has done conversely. A new 
constitution was enacted in 1992 while the 1938 citizenship law has been reestablished, 
although with significant amendments. Both countries, however, agree that only citizens of 
the interwar republic and their descendants belong to the original body politic. All present-day 
permanent residents who have moved to the country in the Soviet period must apply for 
citizenship on a par with recent immigrants and fulfil relatively stringent naturalization 
criteria of for instance proficiency in the state language. Of approximately 600 thousand non-
titulars in Estonia and 900 thousand in Latvia, less than a fourth have qualified for automatic 
citizenship. As a result, the political nation in both countries is a considerably smaller body 
than the total number of permanent residents. 
In Lithuania, the decision to re-enact the interwar republic has not been linked to the 
citizenship issue and all permanent residents have been granted full political rights. There are 
primarily two reasons for this. The titular nation's share of the population is considerably 
larger. Lithuanians do not perceive their ethnic distinctiveness as threatened by alien cultural 
6impulses to the same degree as many Estonians and Latvians obviously do. Furthermore, the 
Lithuanian citizenship law was adopted in November 1989, at a time when Lithuanian 
independence was not yet internationally recognized. Indeed, the adoption of this law was 
used as a means to achieve such recognition. A restrictive law would have been 
counterproductive towards that end, since many world leaders and international organizations 
signalled strong concern for minority protection in the would-be post-Soviet states. In order to 
avoid this predicament, the citizenship debate in Estonia and Latvia was postponed until after 
independence. 
Officially, the Latvian and Estonian treatment of the citizenship issue is based strictly on 
constitutional law. Most observers, however, see it as ethnically motivated: the law-makers 
are concerned not so much with the rights of the pre-war citizens, as with the well-being of 
the titular nationality. Sometimes distinctions between titulars and non-titulars are explicitly 
made in official documents. For instance, the March 1992 Latvian language law clearly favors 
Latvian speakers, much more so than did the previous 1989 law. The legislators justify this as 
necessary to secure the survival of the ethnic Latvia nation. 'Latvia is the only ethnic territory 
(sic) in the world inhabited by the Latvian nation'. (Diena, Riga, 24 April 1992) In Estonia, 
the citizenship law stipulates that the language requirements for citizenship may be waived in 
the case of ethnic Estonians returning to the homeland of their ancestors. Similar clauses may 
be found in the naturalization laws of Germany, Greece, etc., but it nevertheless undermines 
the ostensibly strict legalistic rationale behind the denial of automatic citizenship to Soviet 
immigrants.
Moldova.
The ethno-political situation in Moldova is unique in one respect: The Moldovans speak a 
Romanian dialect, and in the interwar period most of present-day Moldova was a Romanian 
province. For these reasons, Moldova has usually been regarded as a Romanian irredenta, and 
separate Moldovan nation-building was believed to be utterly quixotic, no less impossible 
than was East German nation-building. Moldovan nationalism, it was expected, would 
inevitably lead to demands for Romanian-Moldovan reunification. The ethnic consolidation 
of the Moldovan group was incomplete, not because it contained any significant subgroups, 
but because it was itself regarded as a subgroup of another ethnos. 
For a while Moldovan perestroika activists seemed to confirm the prognoses of Western 
experts on nationalism. As soon as Moldovan independence had been achieved in the fall of 
1991, the Moldovan Popular Front began to press for unification. To its immense chagrin and 
surprise it discovered that neither the masses nor the elites took to the idea. President Mircea 
Snegur, a former apparatchik, now the main Moldovan nation-builder, launched the slogan of 
'ethnic Romanianness and political Moldovanness', which caught on. Since the fall of 
Ceausescu Romania had not been a rose garden, neither in economic nor in political terms. 
Many old Moldovans also remembered that in the interwar period Bucarest politicians had 
treated their region as a backwater province and done precious little to make it prosper. In 
addition, after independence many Moldovan intellectuals who had received prestigious jobs 
in the new state apparatus realized that in the case of unification their nice titles would 
disappear again. It is certainly more impressive to be, for instance, director of a Moldovan 
national bank than to head the local branch of a Romanian national bank. Often rather 
mundane considerations play their part in nation-building processes. 
Finally, the deteriorating relationship with the ethnic minorities discouraged the Moldovans 
from pursuing the unification project. Non-Moldovans make up almost a third of the total 
7population and certainly did not look forward to a minority status in Greater Romania 
together with Hungarians, Gypsies and other beleaguered groups. Partly as a result of such 
apprehensions the Slav-dominated enclave east of the Dniester river proclaimed independence 
from Chisinau in September 1990. The area has embarked upon its own, ostensibly 
supraethnic state-building. In conscious contrast to Moldova, where only Moldovan alias 
Romanian enjoys status as state language, the Dniester Moldovan Republic has no less than 
three state languages, Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian. The latter language, however, 
clearly dominates official business.5 
To the West of the Dniester Moldovan national rhetoric underwent a remarkable 
transformation. As long as the Popular Front held sway in Chisinau, official documents were 
permeated by a higher degree of ethnic language than perhaps in any other Soviet successor 
state. The Moldovan declaration of independence on 27 August 1991 was most ambiguous on 
the issue of reunification vs. Moldovan nation-building, but crystal clear as regards the ethnic 
definition of the nation. Independence was declared ‘in recognition of the thousand year 
existence of our people and its uninterrupted statehood within the historical and ethnic 
boundaries of its national formation’. Similar expressions abounded in law texts and other 
documents from this period. 
In the spring and summer of 1992 a full albeit limited war between Chisinau and the Dniester 
secessionists was won by the latter with the support of Russian military units stationed in the 
area. Two years later political rhetoric in Chisinau was changed towards civic, non-ethnic 
nation-building, and there can be little doubt that the military defeat greatly contributed to this 
new departure. As a small country deficient in resources, squeezed between mightier 
neighbours, Moldova has adjusted its policy to the harsh realities. Moldova is today officially 
no longer a national state of the Moldovans, but a 'multinational state.' The Turkic-speaking 
Gagauzs in the southern part of the country have been granted territorial autonomy on liberal 
terms, and similar conciliatory overtures are made also to the East bank secessionists. It will 
be increasingly difficult for the Dniestrovians to justify their separate state-building project. 
Belarus and Ukraine.
A crucial factor in any nation-building project is the cultural distance between the titular 
group and the numerically largest minorities. A short distance will presumably make it easier 
to gain acceptance among all groups in society for the same symbols and values. A ranking 
list of the Soviet successor states along this dimension will put Belarus and Ukraine at the 
top. In both states the titular nation and the largest minorities are all Eastern Slavs who speak 
related tongues. Together, they make up close to 95% of the total population. Orthodoxy is 
the overwhelmingly predominant religion. Thus, one would think, some propitious 
preconditions for successful nation-building are in place. 
However, the looming proximity of Russia, a much stronger East Slav state which has ruled 
Belarus and Ukraine for centuries, greatly complicates the picture. Historically, the Russians 
have exerted a strong cultural pressure on their Slav neighbours. In Tsarist and Soviet times 
the close cultural affinity among the groups facilitated linguistic Russification of important 
segments of the Ukraine and Belarus populations, not least of the intellectual elites. The 
dilemma of Belarusian and Ukrainian nation-building today is the need a define a separate 
identity for its citizens without alienating its large Russians and Russified population groups.
5 Pål Kolstø & Andrei Edemsky with Natalya Kalashnikova, 'The Dniester Conflict: Between 
Irrendentism and Separatism', Europe-Asia Studies, I, no. 6 (1993) pp. 973-1000. 
8Alongside the political process of nation-building a parallel project of  ethnic consolidation in 
the two countries is attempted. Efforts are make to reduce and hopefully overcome the 
contrasts between the Russophones and the native-speaking members of the titular ethnos. 
This consolidation process is twofold: On the one hand, a common Ukrainian and a common 
Belorussian identity is sought for, on the other hand, a separate identity must be created by 
differentiation from the Russian one. Thus, while the political project of state-building 
requires a rapprochement and easing of contrasts to the local Russians and other 
Russophones, the ethnic consolidation project on the contrary demands the establishment of 
maximum contrast between the titular ethnic group and all things Russian. 
Most evidence indicates that the Belorussian nation-building has foundered on these rocks. To 
be sure, also Belarus has acquired her own state emblem, anthem, stamps, etc., and 
Belarusians participate in international conferences and sports tournaments under Belarusian 
flags. However, very few Belorussians have developed any strong sense of Belorusianness, 
culturally or politically. Belorusian political leaders have not managed, many of them not 
even tried, to define an independent political course for their country, separate from 
Moscow's. 
In January 1994 the leading Belarusian nationalist Zianon Pazniak in desperate tones warned 
his fellow countrymen against throwing themselves into the alluring Russian embrace: 'No 
adequate European Russian nation has ever been formed... This patchwork of a nation does 
not have any defined national territory... Its dominating consciousness is imperial, not 
national.' (Narodna gazeta, Minsk, 15-17 January 1994.) This diatribe fell on deaf ears. In 
May 1995 the populist Belarusian president Lukashenko scored a landslide victory in a 
referendum on closer rapprochement with Russia and the introduction of Russian as a second 
state language. Eventually, he hoped, a Russian-Belarusian federation or confederation would 
be established.
In a comparative perspective the causes behind failed nation-building in an internationally 
recognized, independent state are just as interesting, if not more so, than the success stories. 
To some extent, the Belarusian failure reflects the undeveloped nature of Belarusian 
selfawereness. But world history knows of many cases where the state was established first 
and the nation shaped afterwards within its bosom. I case in point is the Middle East where 
identification with the new states  created in this century clearly seem to be supplanting 
cultural Pan-Arabism. Although the Belarusian case clearly needs more study, I do not believe 
that its outcome was historically predetermined. The rather different fate of modern nation-
building in Ukraine, sharing many of the same cultural and historical preconditions as 
Belarus, should  also serve as a warning against oversimplified cultural explanations. 
Ukrainian nationalism is incomparably more resilient than Belarusian nationalism. Both the 
Ukrainian ethnos and the Ukrainian state have clearly come to stay. The boundaries of the 
ethnic Ukrainian group as well as of the Ukrainian nation in the political sense, however, are 
still in flux. 
Prior to World War II the Ukrainian nation was divided among two or more states: 
Russia/USSR to the East and the Habsburg monarchy/Poland/Romania to the West. In the 
face of strong cultural pressures from the Poles, who dominated the region demographically 
and politically, the Ukrainians in Habsburg Galicia developed a strong sense of ethnic 
9identity. This identity was not primarily 'Galician' but 'Ukrainian': they felt a strong sense of 
solidarity with their Eastern brethren of whom they admittedly had scant knowledge. 
In the quasi-nation state of the Ukrainian SSR the Galicians managed to withstand 
Russification in much the same way as they had previously braved Polonization. In Soviet 
times there was also no major influx of Russian immigrants to the region such as took place 
into the Baltics. Western Ukraine became a greenhouse of Ukrainianness and Ukrainian 
nationalism. During and immediately after the perestroika period Galicians dominated 
political life in Ukraine far out of proportion to their numbers, and secured an unmistakable 
cultural Ukrainian imprint on the Ukrainian state concept. With more than 11m Russians and 
4.5m Ukrainians claiming Russian as their mother tongue in the country, Ukrainian was 
nevertheless proclaimed as the sole state language. History text-books asserted that the 
medieval state of Kievian Rus' was a Ukrainian state, plain and simple, not the cradle of 
Russian statehood, as was taught in Moscow, nor a common East Slav civilization. An 
ancient Kievian symbol, the trident, was chosen as state emblem. During World War II this 
symbol had been used by Galician nationalists fighting against Soviet power, and it was less 
than popular among Eastern Ukrainians who during the same war had fought under Soviet 
standards. 
Nonetheless, the official Ukrainian nation concept is clearly inclusive and civic rather than 
cultural and exclusive in character. In stark contrast to contemporaneous political rhetoric in 
neighboring Moldova, 
the Ukrainian proclamation of sovereignty in 1990 invested state sovereignty not in the 
Ukrainian ethnos, but in 'the people of Ukraine'. President Kravchuk declared that the 
Russians in Ukraine should not be considered as an alien minority. They were no less 
indigenous than the Ukrainians themselves. (Pravda, 16 July 1991) Admittedly, this generous 
attitude was not fully reflected in the 1992 Ukrainian law on national minorities which 
distinguishes sharply between ethnic Ukrainians and the 'minorities'. The civic purport of 
official Ukrainian nation-building was nevertheless indisputable, and has been reinforced 
under president Leonid Kuchma after his election in the summer of 1994. 
In his inauguration speech Kuchma proposed that Ukrainian should retain its position as the 
only state language while Russian should be elevated to a status as 'official language'. This 
proposal arose the ire of Ukrainian nationalists who feared a new wave of creeping 
Russification. Under the telling headline 'No language - no people: no people, no state', the 
chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Committee on Question of Culture and Spirituality, 
Mykola Kosiv, retorted: 
'Ukraine is the Fatherland of the Ukrainian people, who have realized their holy 
right to self-government and created the Ukrainian state in which also some 
national minorities are living ... The Russian people is living in Russia, while 
some minor parts of this people are living as national minorities in Ukraine' 
(Holos Ukrainy, Kiev, 16 September 1994). 
Clearly, the battle for the content of 'The Ukrainian nation' is still not over. 
Transcaucasia.
The major nationalities in the Asian parts of the former USSR are less ethnically consolidated 
than their European counterparts. The one clear exception to this rule is the Armenians who 
10
have developed a strong common identity centered around the traumatic memory of the 1915 
massacre and allegiance to the Armenio-Gregorian church. 
By contrast, the second major Christian people of Transcaucasia, the Georgians, have still not 
fully coalesced into one homogeneous nation. The various sub-ethnoses - the Kartli, Svans, 
Mingrelians, etc. - have retained a high degree a separate identity. The bloody civil war of 
1992 between the followers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the central Tbilisi authorities must be 
understood against this background. Gamsakhurdia was a Mingrelian and his main power 
base Mingrelia. 
In addition to strong intra-ethnic tensions in Georgia there is even stronger inter-ethnic 
antagonism. As Andrei Sakharov remarked in 1989 (Ogonek, 1989 no.31), Georgia can be 
regarded as an empire no less than was the USSR. The point is not that Georgia contains a 
large number of ethnic groups, which do all Soviet successor states, but in the structure of the 
relationship between the minorities and the Georgian-dominated centre. The smaller 
Caucasian people fear Georgian hegemonistic aspirations while the Georgians tend to see a 
drive for secession behind any initiative for greater local autonomy. 
As a legacy of the Communist era Georgia in 1991 contained within herself three autonomous 
formations -- Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Only the Ajars (in effect Muslim 
Georgians), are reconciled to their status in the Georgian state, while both South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia have been theatres of bloody military clashes. In 1992 Tbilisi abrogated the 
autonomous status of both these autonomies in an effort to create a unified, centralized 
Georgian state. In Abkhazia this led to an all-out ethnic civil war. 
War is one of the strongest identity producers available. In armed conflicts the We-They 
contrast, so essential to identity formation, is drawn as with a scalpel. Civil wars reinforce 
tribal, sub-national identities and are strongly deleterious to nation-building. By contrast, wars 
between countries may have the opposite effect of rallying the entire population around the 
national leaders against the foreign adversary. Thus, as regards nation-building, the protracted 
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in southern Transcaucasia may have rather different 
outcomes from the many wars on Georgian soil. 
However, in Soviet times the largest national minority in Armenia were the Azeris (2.5%) and 
the second largest community in Azerbaijan were the Armenians (5.5%). These groups could 
hardly be expected to partake in nation-building projects explicitly directed against their 
ethnic brethren across the border. This problem disappeared after the huge ethnic de-mixing 
of 1988-89, in which no less than 150 thousand Azeris left Armenia for their 'ethnic 
homeland' while just as many Armenians moved in the opposite direction. This indicates that 
nation-building in both countries is basically ethnic rather than civic, despite the granting of 
full political rights to the entire populace. 
Central Asia.
The traditionally nomadic nations of Central Asia, such as the Turkmens, Kyrgyzs and 
Kazakhs, are divided into tribes and tribal confederations, while the old sedentary cultures 
around the southern oases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have retained strong hierarchally 
structured clan loyalties. Both kinds of sub-national cleavages in society impede the 
consolidation of national identities. 
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The Soviet Communists often allowed one or some local clans or tribes to dominate political 
life in the various Asian republics, either as an exercise of divide-and-rule, or because they 
were unable to evict the traditionally dominant groups from the seats of power. In 1993 the 
rivalry between the favoured and underprivileged clans in Tajikistan erupted into a ferocious 
civil war in which the ideological banners of 'Communism', 'Islamism' and 'democracy' were 
but thin fig leaves covering a naked power struggle. Since the war the victors, the Khojent- 
and Kuliab-based 'communists', have not been willing to share power with the conquered 
clans, and the embers of warfare are still smouldering. 
The complete breakdown of social order in Tajikistan served as an object lesson to the 
authorities in its neighbor states. In various ways they have acted to prevent similar calamities 
in their own countries. In Turkmenistan president Niazov has introduced a neo-totalitarian 
personal dictatorship in which leaders of the various tribes are studiously promoted to high 
profile posts of token authority. Much of the same recipe is followed also by president 
Karimov in Uzbekistan.
In ethnic terms the Uzbek nation is a strange mixture of various ethnic layers. The nomadic 
Shaibanid Uzbek tribes who conquered the region in the early sixteenth century have merged 
with the autochthonous populations, but not quite. Substantial sub-national identities linger 
on, although it is not clear to what extent they can be mobilized for political purposes. 
At the same time the Uzbeks  as a group are numerous and powerful enough to be regarded by 
the titular nations in neighboring states as the potential hegemon of the region. Fears of 
Uzbek domination have served as a damper on Central Asian cooperation and integration. In 
spite of themselves the Uzbeks have contributed to national consolidation in the adjacent 
states. This seems to be the case in for instance Kyrgyzstan, where common suspicion of 
Uzbek designs have kept in check strong animosity between Northern and Southern Kyrgyz 
tribes. 
Another factor which boosts the formation of supra-tribal and supra-clannish identities among 
the Central Asians, is the presence of large European communities in their midst. In 
Transcaucasia  demographic Slav penetration  was never strong, but in all Central Asian states 
Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians form considerable minorities. This is particularly true 
of the North-Eastern ones, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. During World War II the Slavic 
settler communities were joined by other Europeans such as Germans and Poles who were 
deported there for political reasons. In the local popular mind, all of these groups are often 
indiscriminately lumped together as 'the Russians'. This is done more on the basis of language 
and culture than on racial criteria. Also Volga-Tatar immigrants and even local Koreans 
(deported to the area by Stalin in the 1930s) are regularly regarded as members of the 
'Russian' group on the basis of their preferred language of communication.
In the 20th century Central Asian societies have been characterized by a marked ethno-social 
bifurcation. The indigenous culture dominates completely in the countryside while the cities 
have been formed in the Soviet-style European mould. In 1989 no more than 27% of the 
inhabitants of the Kyrgyzstani capital were ethnic Kyrgyzs while 65% were Europeans. The 
figures for the Kazakhstani capital were even more disadvantageous for the titular nation. In 
this country at large the Kazakhs in 1989 constituted 39.5% and the Russophones 47%. 
The Kazakhstani ethno-demographic situation may be compared to the Latvian one. Both 
countries ought to be described as bicultural rather than multicultural. The vast majority of the 
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population partake in one of two major linguistic cultures of roughly equal size, the 
Russophone and the indigenous cultures. The tenor of official nation-building in these two 
countries, however, is rather different. While in Latvia the Latvian ethnos is regarded as the 
core and main component of the political Latvian nation, the Kazakhstani president 
Nazarbaev is strenuously promoting a supraethnic nation concept. In May 1993 he pointed out 
that 
In the world there are quite a few states, even very prospering ones, in 
which there are more different nations and nationalities than we have in 
Kazakhstan. In these countries patriotism is especially strongly developed. A 
devotional attitude towards the state symbols reigns in society. For instance, at 
the beginning of the school day, during the swearing in of a jury or an official, 
and at many other events and mass gatherings the state flag is being flyed and the 
national anthem is being played. (Sovety Kazakhstana, Almaty, 13 May 1993)
This is civic nation-building in pure form. Obviously, Nazarbaev's prototype is USA. In order 
to combat ethnic polarization of national politics Nazarbaev has encouraged the creation of of 
political parties reaching out to all ethnic groups. Only to a limited extent has this strategy 
been successful. Politics are gradually being monopolized by ethnic Kazakhs. In the 
parliament which was dissolved in 1995 there were 103 ethnic Kazakh deputies as against 49 
Russians. There are no strong reasons to expect that this imbalance will decrease in the next 
elections. 
Politics in Kazakhstan are largely a matter of striking the necessary compromises between the 
three large Kazakh hordes (zhuzes), the Great, Middle and Small horde. For instance, the 
decision to move the capital from the south to the northern city of Akmola (Tselinograd), 
away from the stronghold of the Great horde, should probably be seen in this light, rather than 
as an attempt to move the centre of political decision making closer to the Slav heartland. 
To some extent the exclusion of Europeans from influence and control in society is a result of 
social dynamics outside Nazarbaev's control. However, also on the legislative level a 
preferential treatment of ethnic Kazakhs and of Kazakh culture is discernible. The 
Kazakhstani constitution opens up for dual citizenship for ethnic Kazakhs living abroad 
(many Kazakhs fled to China and Mongolia under Stalin) while dual citizenship is denied to 
Russians living in Kazakhstan. Also, the Kazakhstani immigration law allows for free return 
of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad but stipulates quota regulations for other ethnic groups. 
Particularly galling to the local Russians is the renaming of Slavic towns and streets in 
Kazakh manner in compactly Slavic areas. Clearly, this runs counter to the professed goal of 
civic nation-building. 
In small mountainous Kyrgyzstan Central Asia's most ambitious experiment in Western-style 
democracy has been launched. President Akaev allows a degree of press freedom 
unprecedented in the region but it can be argued that this licence has increased rather than 
eased ethnic tension in society. In the freewheeling Kyrgyzstani media pluralism even the 
most rabid nationalists and xenophobes can find a publisher and scare up his neighbors. 
There are some similarities between Moldovan and Kyrgyzstani nationalism. In both 
countries there is a streak of racism and extremism among the very small but aggressive 
cultural elite. Perhaps we are entitled to see in this some kind of social regularity: the 
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shrillness of nationalist rhetoric is likely to increase in proportion to the frailty of the national 
intelligentsia. 
President Akaev has had to exert his full authority to avoid the passing of blatantly ethnically 
biased legislation in the Kyrgyzstani parliament, such as a law stipulating that all Kyrgyzstani 
land belongs to the Kyrgyz ethnic group. Kyrgyzstani nationalists, however, have not been put 
in place as have their Moldovan counterparts but still represent a force to be reckoned with. 
Under Communism the Kyrgyzs were often condescendingly treated by the Slavs as ignorant 
hill-billies, and 
Akaev is heedful of the desires of his ethnic brethren to receive a place in the sun. To a larger 
extent than the legislation in most Soviet successor states, the Kyrgyzstani constitution gives 
the ethnic Kyrgyz group a privileged status in the nation-building project. As the preamble 
states, 'We, the people of Kyrgyzstan, strive to secure the national renaissance of the Kyrgyzs 
and to defend and develop the interests of the representatives of the other nationalities.' The 
Europeans ask sarcastically: against whom shall we be defended? Against the Kyrgyzs? If so, 
who shall protect us? The same Kyrgyzs? (Slavianskie vesti, Bishkek, 1992, no. 2) A growing 
number of Europeans feel alienated in Kyrgyzstani society and move out at a pace of 5% a 
year. 
Also from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan significant outmigration of Europeans is 
taking place, indicating that the endeavours to create supraethnic national identities in these 
states are in dire straits. In none of these states has the titular ethnic group been singled out for 
special treatment in the constitution or in other legal acts such as has been done in Latvia, 
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. However, in spite of the political correctness of official rhetoric the 
titular ethnos is everywhere becoming 'the state-bearing nation' . It increasingly monopolizes 
political life and fills up most of the prestigious jobs in culture and society. To some degree 
this tendency reflects the raising educational and modernizational levels of the indigenous 
Central Asians, but even more it reveals the reemergence of atavistic political patterns of 
premodern societies. When the clans and tribes have divided among themselves the 
prestigious jobs and positions, there are few left for the Europeans. As one exasperated 
Russian in Kyrgyzstan exclaimed: 'Every new boss starts by vacating with all possible means 
the lucrative jobs [under his authority] to make room for his fellow clansmen. Without the 
support of his kin he is a nobody, and he will be 'eaten up' by somebody else. Who are 
suffering under this system? Of course, the "aliens", that is: we, the Russians, since we have 
nobody high up to defend us. (V. Uleev in Res Publica, Bishkek, 15 May 1993). 
 
In Estonia and Latvia the indigenous ruling elites have tried to engineer the political 
marginalization of the Slavs by legal means. This strategy may in time become less effective 
as ever-larger groups of non-citizens are being naturalized and make use of their political 
rights. For instance, in the 1995 elections the Russian faction in the Estonian parliament 
Riigikogu increased to six deputies, up from zero in 1992. By contrast, in several Central 
Asian states, despite some overt high-level attempts to create supraethnic states, the exclusion 
of Europeans from political power seems to be increasing. 
***
The breakup of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union after the fall of 
Communism have provided students of nation-building with an abundance of comparative 
cases. Not since the decolonization of Africa has the world experienced a similar proliferation 
of new states in one and the same area. The post-Soviet states have all the necessary 
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requirements for fruitful comparison: A large number of similarities but also striking 
differences. This essay should be regarded as a first exploration into an academically 
rewarding and politically highly important terrain. 
